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We examine the relationship between information and communication technology for development (ICT4D) and local 
historically embedded institutions. We argue that, to understand the process of implementing IT artifacts, one needs to 
consider not only technical feasibility and economic viability but also institutional permissibility. We present a novel 
theoretical framework based on dialectics and institutional theory and apply it to a case study that contributes a 
dialectics-centered framework illustrated with empirical data from the informal sector in Latin America. The analysis 
demonstrates the institutionalization of IT artifacts as a conflicted and contested process and that historical institutions 
may enable some forms of institutionalization while resisting others contrary to social norms. We examine the emergence 
of contradictions, active praxis, and the resulting outcomes before concluding that, for IT artifacts to contribute to 
development, one must emphasize the embedded institutional arrangements and contestation that historically embedded 
institutions present. We conclude the paper by discussing the theoretical and practical implications. 
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1 Introduction 
Researchers generally agree information communication technology (ICT) has a beneficial role in 
development (e.g., Donner, 2009; Heeks, 2008; Sein & Harindranath, 2004; World Bank, 2012). Heeks 
(2008) defines ICT for development (ICT4D) as harnessing digital technologies in the service of the 
world’s most challenging development problems. However, senior scholars have identified a high failure 
rate of ICT4D projects and an enduring “techno-centric” approach that indicates the positive relation 
between the widespread investment in ICT and economic growth (Avgerou, 2008; Dodson, Sterling, & 
Bennett, 2012; Fonseca 2010). Literature over the last two decades has emphasized the importance of 
social and cultural dimensions in enrolling IT artifacts 1 in organizations. Walsham and Sahay (1999) 
provide one example, which details the problematic implementation of geographical information systems 
(IS) in India due to the lack of congruence between Western embedded values (e.g., the use of maps) and 
local understanding. This and other research (e.g., Miscione 2007; Puri & Sahay, 2007) presents ICT4D 
as problematic and contested and casts doubt on the “techno-centric” deterministic premise that the 
introduction of ICT will lead inevitably to development. 
In recent years a stream of contexualist research has emerged both in mainstream IS (Nielsen, Mathiassen, & 
Newell, 2014) and ICT4D (Avgerou, 2010; Noir & Walsham, 2007; Rajão & Hayes, 2009) that applies new 
institutional theory to understand institutionalization2. However, with the exception of Rajão and Hayes (2009), 
few studies have identified the importance of a dialectical lens to understand the role of historically embedded 
institutions, conflict, and contestation in ICT adoption in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). 
These foundational elements serve as the main motivating force for our paper: we propose a framework 
based on an institutional and dialectical approach to ICT4D. We draw on Seo and Creed’s (2002) 
dialectical perspective on institutional change to empirically examine the emergence of contradictions that 
ICT and historically embedded institutions present. By adopting this approach, we can analyze in detail 
the sources of contradictions and praxis that, when considered together, explain change or persistence. 
We conducted an interpretive case study (Walsham, 1995, 2006) of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) 
in the informal sector that the Mexican Government targeted as part of the millennium development goals 
(MDG). We analyze how the interplay of the political and technical aspects of IT artifacts shape 
institutionalization and how understanding this interplay provides rich insight into the dynamics of ICT4D in 
the context of the informal sector in an LMIC. 
We posit two research questions: 
RQ1: How does the institutionalization of IT artifacts create contradictions in and between 
institutions? 
RQ2:  How, through praxis, are these contradictions resolved? 
With this paper, we contribute a novel theoretical framework that allows researchers to examine the 
dynamics of the institutionalization of IT artifacts and involves the three-stage process of contradiction, 
praxis, and outcome. We also challenge techno-centric and deterministic assumptions of the 
institutionalization of IT artifacts and instead offer a complex explanation based on contestation. Finally, 
we bridge the ICT4D and mainstream IS domains by contributing reverse innovation with the lessons 
abstracted from the case analysis to offer insights into institutionalization relevant to wider IS research. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline the paper’s theoretical background. In Section 3, 
we describe the research design and methodology. In Section 4, we apply the theoretical framework that 
we developed to examine the case through three vignettes. Specifically, we examine 1) the potential use 
                                                     
1  Our use of the term “enrolling IT artifacts” aligns with Noir and Walsham (2007) who argue for acknowledgment of the 
indeterminacy of ICT implementation and for an institutionalist perspective on IS implementation. We draw on Rajão and Hayes’ 
(2009) definition of information technology (IT) artifacts as “bundles of material and cultural properties packaged in some socially 
recognizable form such as hardware and/or software” (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001, p. 121). IT artifacts comprise both material 
affordances (i.e., design features) and established and envisaged uses or organizing visions (i.e., ideal and actual work practices 
related to the artifact) (Swanson & Ramiller, 1997; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). 
2 Institutional theory posits that institutions are social structures such as taken-for-granted norms institutionalized as belief systems 
transmitted across generations through rites, rituals, routines, and artifacts. Institutionalization denotes the process whereby social 
activity becomes eventually more or less taken for granted. Actors across an organizational field drive these ongoing processes of 
institutionalization; however, fields are not static, and participants enter and leave and new agendas emerge with competing beliefs 
and rationales about how to organize and structure practice including practices related to IT artifacts (Scott, 2001; Neilsen et al., 
2013). 
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of mobile phones to improve efficiency in the ordering process, 2) the outcome when an MSE attempted 
to develop an Internet-based ordering system, and 3) institutions related to the business utility of using 
email, digital catalogs, and websites. In Section 5, we discuss our findings, our paper’s contributions to 
theory and practice, and possible areas for future research. 
2 Theoretical Grounding 
In their review paper, Sein and Harindranath (2004) assert that policymakers and donor agencies have 
come to recognize ICT as an important contributor to industrial and economic development. They classify 
ICT’s contributions into three main perspectives: modernization, dependency, and human-centeredness 
(or human development). The modernization perspective argues that developing nations should emulate 
some of the strategies from developed nations such as using capital and technology as a catalyst to 
accelerate growth. This perspective, which equates development with modernization, has been 
discredited because it does not take cultural and local contexts into account. The dependency perspective 
argues that economic growth in developed countries leads to the underdevelopment of poorer countries 
(mostly former colonies) that may, as a result, be subject to negative terms of trade and technology and 
industrial dependency. This view is also discredited because it treats all underdeveloped countries 
uncritically and puts the onus of development on local government resources rather than the global 
context. The human development perspective focuses on individuals’ capabilities, specifically related to 
their economic, social, and political development. Prior research in ICT4D has demonstrated the 
relationship between institutions and human development (Bass, Nicholson, & Subramanian, 2013). We 
ground our institutional analysis in a development context aligned with a perspective that societies with 
inclusive institutions foster economic development through the protection of property rights and broad-
based political participation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Inclusive institutions incentivize investments in 
education, encourage the use of new technologies, and allow individuals to lead the lives they choose. In 
contrast, extractive institutions tend to allow only a small elite to accumulate benefits while leaving a large 
segment of society excluded and underdeveloped. In attempting to answer the question of how these 
processes involve ICT, we identify four main uses of ICT in development: 
• To serve as a commodity in itself 
• To support development activity 
• To drive the economy, and 
• To support specific sectors or projects 
We can broadly classify research in each of these development discourses and application areas into two main 
camps: the optimistic camp and the pessimistic camp. The optimistic camp suggests that ICT leads to 
development, and the pessimistic camp suggests that ICT alone does not unless accompanied by social change. 
This paper is aligned with and builds on the human-development perspective and the pessimistic camp, the 
latter of which draws on institutional theory and has received increasing acceptance as a valuable theoretical 
framework to understand IS-related processes (e.g., Avgerou, 2000, 2002; King, Gurbaxani, Kraemer, 
McFarlan, Raman, & Yap, 1994; Noir & Walsham, 2007; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001; Silva & Figueroa, 2002). 
In brief, institutional analysis enables one to examine how broad social and historical forces that range from 
explicit laws to implicit cultural understandings affect and are affected by individuals’ and organizations’ 
actions (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001, p. 153). Further, institutional analysis considers social and cultural 
contexts to be as important as the technology itself (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Sein & Harindranath, 2004). 
Institutional theorists perceive organizations as being suspended in a web of institutions; in effect, 
organizations inhabit institutions (Barley & Tolbert, 1997), and applying an institutional framework highlights 
the societal rules and beliefs derived from political or regulatory demands, prescriptions of professional 
associations and consultants, or mimetic activities (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). 
Moving to the IS literature, King et al. (1994) define an institution as “any standing entity that exerts 
influence and regulation over other social entities” (p. 141), which emphasizes the regulative aspect of 
institutions (government authorities, international agencies, trade associations). Because we focus on 
contested change, we draw on Nielsen, Mathiassen, and Newell (2014) and their identification of salient 
themes for applying institutional theory to IS research to review the literature in ICT4D. 
The first theme focuses on the effect of institutions, and much of this research is at the sectoral or project 
level. The evolving discourse on the implications of power structures emphasizes how the institutions in 
developing countries may permit dysfunctional outcomes in ICT projects; for example, Sahay and 
851 Exploring the Dialectics Underlying Institutionalization of IT Artifacts 
 
Volume 18   Issue 12  
 
Walsham (1996) illustrate how political priorities often override technical recommendations surrounding 
implementation of projects. As another example, Puri and Sahay (2007) analyze the negative impact that 
corruption can have within organizations when implementing free and open source software. In the same 
vein, Diaz-Andrade and Urquhart (2012) found that ICT4D projects that do not consider locally accepted 
beliefs and embedded power structures are more likely to fail since the current beneficiaries of the existing 
institutional arrangements may actively resist new IT artifacts that could undermine their power structures. 
Other researchers in ICT4D have focused on the effect of networks on the use of IT artifacts; for example, 
Saebo and Sahay (2013) found that enrolment is not only based on individual decision making but also 
influenced by the organizational field, which demonstrates the role of “distributed agency” (Lawrence, 
Suddaby & Leca, 2011). In exploring the particular challenges that MSEs face, Beckinsale and Ram 
(2006) found that peer groups more strongly influenced enrolment behavior than bigger enterprises, which 
indicates that large firms can act more autonomously but that MSEs require sectoral consensus. This 
point is relevant to our research because it points to the limitations of a “top-down” approach to ICT4D. 
Furthermore, weaknesses in institutions at the macro-level (e.g., contract enforcement) may suggest that 
local institutions have a significant influence on agency. However, to date, little research has examined 
the role of micro-level institutions on MSEs and specifically how “distributed agency” (Lawrence et al., 
2011) builds the necessary consensus for successful institutionalization. 
The second theme in Nielsen et al.’s (2014) review explores the interaction between institutions. In doing so, 
they assume that institutionalization progresses better when congruent with (and that will encounter difficulty 
when it acts counter to) institutions. Some prior literature has used institutional theory to make sense of 
contested change and the role of ICT in that process; for example, Rajão and Hayes (2009) propose a 
dialectical analytical framework to analyze how one may understand IT artifacts as both enablers and 
constrainers of change. Martin (1984) illustrates divergent outcomes well by describing them as “pull” and 
“push” forces on ICT enrolment. For Martin, the pull pressure for use emanates from external agents, such 
as the demands of customers, and push forces occur when organizations develop IT artifacts based on their 
core competencies before then pushing it to customers or suppliers. Silva and Hirschheim (2007) illustrate 
the problem in relying on pull pressure from studying the implementation of a strategic IS project in the 
Ministry of Health in Guatemala. The project, which the central government developed, sought to encourage 
local hospitals to adopt new technologies. However, local agents met the pull pressure that the central 
government exerted with suspicion, which ultimately led to fierce resistance. Miscione’s (2007) work on the 
institutionalization of telemedicine in the Amazon region of Brazil further strengthens this finding: the author 
found that successful enrolment of ICT requires local accountability. The author found that locals in the 
Amazon region resisted enrolment partially due to a mismatch between macro assumptions of effective 
healthcare delivery and those of local institutions. Madon (2014) provides further insight into local 
accountability: from analyzing a health project in India, the author concludes that successful 
institutionalization requires one to consider how the IT artifact impacts other aspects of social life. 
In various ways, the literature outlined here focuses on the interactions between macro and micro agents 
and suggests that local acceptance requires development projects to develop strong local accountability. 
This point is relevant to this research because it focuses on how actors in the local context may develop 
divergent goals from macro agents (e.g., policymakers or consultants). From reviewing data related to the 
enrolment of IT artifacts in LMICs, Chaudhuri (2012) explains that emotive and utilitarian rationales 
influence users’ to adopt them and that IT artifacts with an emotional impact have the highest usage rates. 
Chaudhuri (2012) found that users are more likely to adopt mobile phones because of the emotive 
component of allowing users to contact distant family while they are less likely to other IT artifacts such as 
computers and access to the Internet due to associating them with a more utilitarian purpose. Chaudhuri’s 
findings indicate that low-income individuals in LMICs are less likely to allocate resources to IT artifacts if 
they perceive that they have only utilitarian purposes. 
The third stream focuses on the institutionalization process of IT artifacts. Sahay, Saebo and Braa (2013) 
exemplify such research: they analyze case study evidence from India and focus on an IS project’s scaling 
over a 15-year period. They conclude that, in the project, successful institutionalization required an 
integrative approach of aligning organizational-political actors. Avgerou (2013) highlights the social aspects 
of institutionalization in a study of e-voting in Brazil. This author notes that building and maintaining 
legitimacy required active effort from the electoral commission, which demonstrates that institutionalization is 
both a technical and social process. This example indicates a positive interaction between the micro and 
macro actors cited as a necessary element for successful ICT4D (Hayes & Westrup, 2012). Furthermore, 
building the appropriate ICT infrastructure is necessary but not sufficient alone for successful 
institutionalization. Sahay et al. (2013) provide insights into the differences in IT enrolment between LMIC 
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and the developed world by indicating that the successful institutionalization process requires additional 
steps unnecessary in the developed world. Unfortunately, the authors do not clearly prescribe the steps and 
how projects can incorporate such steps to increase the likelihood of success. 
Table 1 summarizes the literature on the institutionalization of IT artifacts by building on Nielsen et al.’s 
(2014) review of institutional literature in mainstream IS. 
Table 1. Institutionalization of IT Artifact Literature 




Examines the effects of 
institutional pressures 
on the use of IT artifacts 
Local political context impacts success of ICT4D projects (Diaz-Andrade & 
Urquhart, 2012). 
Local networks and belief systems impact the enrolment of IT artifacts in the 





interaction between IT 
artifacts and institutions 
The interaction must include local accountability (Miscione, 2007). 
Successful enrolment requires positive interaction between micro and macro 
actors (Hayes & Westrup, 2012). 
Enrolment is emotive and not transactional (Chaudhuri, 2012) and requires 






process of IT artifacts 
The institutionalization process requires intermediate steps in ICT4D 
contexts (Sahay et al., 2013). 
2.1 The Dialectical Perspective on the Institutionalization of IT Artifacts 
We adopt a dialectical framework to capture the dynamic nature of IT artifacts’ institutionalization. By using 
such a framework, we form a view of the social world as being in a state of continual change; this world 
contains social structures that initially appear firm but prove more tenuous in reality (Benson, 1977). The Greek 
term “dialectic”, derived from “dialogue” between equal partners, implies a unity of opposites. Theories that 
incorporate dialectical explanations for social change identify forces that both promote and oppose social 
change (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995; Putnam, Fairhurst, & Banghart, 2016). These theories suit our research 
because we identify the interplay of these forces. Although ICT4D research mostly neglects this theoretical 
framework, some literature in mainstream IS does draw on a dialectical account of process (e.g., Robey & 
Boudreau, 1999; Robey & Holmstrom, 2001), which accounts for a variety of observed outcomes. For these 
reasons, we adopt a dialectical approach in analyzing the dynamics of IT artifacts’ institutionalization. 
Seo and Creed (2002) draw on Benson’s (1977) framework to understand the process underlying 
institutional change. This framework assesses the historically embedded nature of institutions, the 
dynamic contestation involved in building new institutions, and the subsequent (and necessary) 
deinstitutionalization of existing structures. 
2.1.1 Sources of Institutional Contradiction 
According to Holm (1995), institutional theory possesses the inherent contradiction of embedded stability 
and agency. We rely on Benson’s (1977) definition of contradiction as the presence of various 
inconsistencies and tensions in and between existing social structures. In our case, the contradiction 
surrounds how agents can change institutional arrangements if their actions and worldview reside in the 
very institutions that they propose to alter. A potential solution to this contradiction lies in focusing on the 
mechanisms that facilitate institutional change or reinforce institutions. 
This concept of contradiction is familiar to institutional theorists, and many concur that contradictions can lead to 
the development of new institutional arrangements with the new arrangements’ being convergent or divergent 
from previous institutions (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Jepperson, 1991; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2001). 
Seo and Creed (2002) identify four possible sources of contradiction: efficiency, adaptability, conformity, 
and isomorphism: 
1. Efficiency contradictions arise in circumstances when structures that provide legitimacy 
undermine efficiency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). A central tenet of 
institutional theory is the premise that organizational success depends on factors other than 
technical efficiency and organizations gain legitimacy by becoming isomorphic with their 
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institutional environments. Institutions that establish and maintain legitimacy may produce 
persistent structures that undermine organizational performance. 
2. Contradictions related to adaptability occur when current organizational adaptability limits 
future adaptability. Institutional isomorphism that increases legitimacy is an adaptive move for 
organizational survival, but, once institutionalized, a structure or activity persists and is 
maintained. Thus, organizations that operate in the same organizational field tend towards 
isomorphism, and, once structures are institutionalized, further adaptations may encounter 
resistance. Individuals come to perceive practices as “natural” and, thus, do not question them 
vis-a-vis alternatives. As a result, individuals’ behavior, while consistent with internal norms, 
becomes unresponsive to changes in the external environment. 
3. Contradictions related to conformity present a perspective in which organizations exist in 
pluralistic environments that have inconsistent prescriptions for action (Friedland & Alford 
1991). The major institutions of contemporary Western society (capitalist market, the nuclear 
family, the bureaucratic state, liberal democracy, and Judeo-Christian religious traditions) have 
mutually interdependent and yet contradictory sets of material practices and symbolic 
constructions. These logics may contradict: for instance, capitalist markets may depend on 
families to minimize the costs of labor supply, but labor market practices may weaken the 
family system in the work/life balance. Organizations tend to incorporate incompatible practices 
and procedures in searching for legitimacy and stability, and this source of contradiction moves 
beyond the organizational field and explores the dynamic societal context, which involves 
multiple levels and complex elements of interconnectedness. 
4. Contradictions related to isomorphism concern conflicts with divergent interests. Proponents of 
a dialectical perspective see institutional arrangements as the products of political struggles 
among various participants who have divergent interests and asymmetric power. Isomorphism 
is likely to reflect the needs of the most powerful interests in the relevant organizational field. 
Thus, the resulting institutional arrangements tend to satisfy the needs of some individuals 
more than others. The contradiction lies in misalignment between a particular form of social 
arrangement and the interests of diverse actors who enact, inhabit, and reproduce that social 
arrangement who may become conscious of the institutional conditions that leave their needs 
unmet and take action to change the present order. While institutional change requires a 
contradiction to emerge, change is neither deterministic nor inevitable, and making sense of 
the contradictions requires one to explore human praxis. 
2.1.2 Praxis as the Core Mediating Mechanism of Institutional Change  
Praxis describes the attempt to alter social arrangements by acting in a way contrary to the existing social 
order. We define contestation in our theoretical framework as the combination of three elements—
contradiction, praxis, and outcome—and this process unleashes the forces of opposition to 
institutionalized structures (Cho, Mathiassen & Robey, 2007). 
According to Seo and Creed (2002), institutional change is the outcome of institutional contradictions and 
human praxis. Further the concept of human praxis is based on the assumption that humans possess a 
degree of autonomy from the institutions in which they reside (Benson, 1977) consistent with DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) idea of loose coupling. However, a question remains about how praxis takes place or 
the conditions that cause individuals to take action. Seo and Creed (2002) suggest that the likelihood of 
praxis increases as an actor’s social experience is continually confronted by ever increasing tensions that 
emerge from contradictions both within and across institutions with the agents transforming from a passive 
role to a more active one. Praxis requires institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) who 
artfully mobilize different institutional contradictions to actively participate in reconstructing the institution 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991) in order to serve their own interests. In short, institutional change requires 
human agency, which, in turn, relies on growing institutional contradictions to trigger such human action. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Table 2 illustrates the theoretical framework that we use to explore the empirical data. The concentric 
circles represent the IT artifacts and institutions respectively; the overlap illustrates the areas of 
contestation. The lower part of the diagram zooms in on what occurs during the contestation, which 
comprises three distinct stages: the emergence of a contradiction between the IT artifact and the local 
institutions, the engagement of praxis, and an outcome that reflects how actors resolved the contestation. 
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Interdependent opposites aligned with forces that push-pull on one another like a rubber 
band and exist in an ongoing dynamic interplay as the poles implicate one another. 
Focuses on the unity of opposites and the forces or processes that connect them 
(Putnam, Fairhurst, & Banghart, 2016). 
IT artifact 
IT artifacts are “bundles of material and cultural properties packaged in some socially 
recognizable form such as hardware and/or software” (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001, p. 
121). IT artifacts comprise both material affordances (i.e., design featgures) and 
established and envisaged uses or organizing visions (i.e., ideal and actual work 
practices related to the artifact) (Swanson & Ramiller, 1997; Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). 
Institutions 
Institutions are the socially constructed “rules of the game” that both constrain and enable 
social activity by providing frameworks for judging which behavioral, organizing, 
discursive, and interaction patterns are appropriate (Scott, 2001). 
Contestation Contestation is the three-step process of the emergence of institutional contradicts, praxis, and outcome 
Contradiction Contradictions emerge from the presence of various inconsistencies and tensions in and between existing social structures (Seo & Creed, 2002). 
Praxis 
Praxis refers to how agents purposefully deviate from existing institutions based on some 
level of understanding of the limits of the current social structure and the potential 
benefits of the proposed structure (Jepperson, 1991). 
Outcome The result of contestation, which one can view as a continuum of change or persistence in institutional arrangements. 
3 Methodology 
In this section, we present the methodology we used in our research. Specifically, in Section 3.1, we 
discuss the research design; in Section 3.2, we detail our data-collection methods; and, in Section 3.2, we 
review the data-analysis techniques that we employed. 
3.1 Research Design 
We drew on Walsham’s (1995, 2006) interpretivist case study methods, which advocate that the 
perception of reality is a social construct and that individuals form meaning via inter-subjectivity (Klein and 
Myers, 1999). To conduct our research, we took an inductive approach by using interviews and 
observational data and reviewing archival evidence to better understand how informants interpreted their 
context and how that influenced their behavior (Berger & Luckman, 1966). 
855 Exploring the Dialectics Underlying Institutionalization of IT Artifacts 
 
Volume 18   Issue 12  
 
3.2 Data Collection 
We faced the challenge of developing a deep understanding of how and why informants used IT artifacts 
or not and how they made sense of IT artifacts in their personal and business operations. To collect data, 
we combined three approaches: semi-structured interviews, observations, and a review of archival data. 
Table 3 summarizes our data-collection methods. We collected evidence in two phases and interviewed 
58 different informants in total. In phase one, we interviewed 34 informants in January, 2010; in phase 
two, we interviewed 24 informants in July, 2012. We conducted the interviews with insight from Myers and 
Newman’s (2007) guidelines, and we adopted a snowball strategy to select informants, which, according 
to Bryman and Bell (2007), is an appropriate strategy when sampling requires inside information. 
Snowball sampling involves identifying informants and asking them to identify other possible informants 
(Atkinson & Flint, 2001). In doing so, it relies on using existing social networks and, thus, allows 
researchers to make “warm calls” rather than “cold calls” when recruiting potential research participants. 
While the snowball strategy runs counter to many traditional assumptions inherent in random sampling, it 
has clear advantages when researching vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations (Atkinson & Flint, 
2001). MSEs operating in the informal sector are typically difficult to identify due to a lack of formal 
government registration, operations that are commonly located in domestic households, and firms and 
individuals that tend to move in and out of the sector (Duncombe, 2006); by employing a snowball 
strategy, we could better overcome some of these challenges. The sampling began with one of the 
researchers who drew on twenty years of work experience in the sector to identify the initial contacts. The 
researcher then asked these contacts to identify and introduce him to other MSEs that were 
“entrepreneurial”, designing new products, and not solely relying on pirated designs. Such an approach 
concurs with the literature, which identifies that institutional entrepreneurs are the agents that develop new 
social structures (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Furthermore, the approach ultimately proved successful in 
this case: all but one of the MSEs we contacted agreed to participate in the study. 
Table 3. Data Collection 
What? How? 
Interviews 
We conducted a total of 58 semi-structured interviews. We used eight initial open questions to guide 
the interviews, and the interviews all lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. We conducted the interviews 
in participants’ homes or workshops. We digitally recorded the interviews and had them professionally 
transcribed and translated. We selected the informants using a snowball strategy. We collected the 
participants’ demographic information in phase one to ensure that the sample represented (in income) 
the general population. 
Observation 
After the interviews, we spent two to six hours observing participants’ behavior. During the observation 
phase, we also asked follow-up questions if the behavior we observed required further explanation. 
Specifically, we observed: 1) the interactions between informants and other members of the MSEs and 
2) the interaction between informants and their suppliers/customers. During the observations, we made 
a note of the context including relevant symbolism and the structure of the interaction. 
Review of 
archival data 
After the observation phase, we asked informants who had reported using IT artifacts to provide 
evidence that they had done so, which included business-related emails, websites, or digital catalogs. 
The Hawthorne effect proposes that people behave differently when someone observes them and that 
they may try to please a researcher (Myers, 2013), which can lead to a tendency in informants to 
provide the answers that they believe the interviewer wants to hear. For example, a number of 
informants stated that they had websites and digital catalogs or corresponded via email. Mindful of the 
need not to offend informants, we took care in making subsequent requests for archival data. For 
example, an informant may have indicated that they had created a digital catalog for their jewelry but, 
when asked to present the evidence, stated that the computer was not currently working. In such 
situations, we did not pursue the issue. 
The data-collection technique we chose to gather the observational empirical data drew on the techniques 
of ethnographic field research (Myers, 2013). Fieldwork in qualitative research focuses on gathering data 
in situ or on creating a natural setting so that researchers become personally immersed in the context in 
order to gain some a level of understanding of the ongoing social activity they observe (Wolcott, 2005). 
We considered how we designed our data collection methods carefully in order to ensure that we 
adequately examined the historical, political, and economic institutions that frame the social construct, 
meanings, and shared understandings present in the sector (Klein & Myers, 1999). In addition, by 
adopting a semi-structured interview format, we successfully elicited rich data from informants in the form 
of stories. They spoke at length about their ambitions for their MSEs, their struggles in making a living, 
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and their dreams for a better future for their children, all of which provided deep insights and a rich data 
set regarding the context and the role of IT artifacts in the business operations. In addition to our 
observations, we were sometimes invited to help in the workshop making jewelry or to share drinks or eat 
a meal with the MSE owners and their families. These interactions led to many relevant informal 
conversations, which we wrote up as notes as soon as possible afterwards. 
Our research focuses on handicraft production given its prevalence as a form of income generation 
activity amongst indigenous communities and its importance to international aid agencies as a mechanism 
to lift the poorest people out of poverty (Blue, 2006; UNCTAD, 2003). According to the World Bank (2012), 
some 52 percent of the Mexican population lives below the poverty line, while poverty rates in Guerrero 
(the location we examined) range from 65-80 percent (US State Department, 2014). We selected the 
silver handicraft market, which comprises about two thousand MSEs, in order to capitalize on the twenty 
years of professional experience in the sector of one of the authors. Table 4 applies the Mexican 
Association of Market Research and Public Opinion’s seven-point scale (Asociacion Mexicana de 
Agencias de Investigacion de Mercados y Opinion Publica, 2007) to categorize income of the MSEs. 
Based on this scale, we can see that we can categorize 57 out of our 58 informants as either extremely 
poor or very poor. We deemed a total of 40 (or 69 percent) to be extremely poor because their income 
placed them at the lowest point on the scale and 17 (or 29 percent) as very poor because their income 
placed them in the second to lowest point on the scale. One informant declined to answer the question 
about monthly income. The MSEs averaged 4.2 workers (including family members). While some had as 
many as ten employees, the typical enterprise comprised a husband, wife, and children. These findings 
confirm that we captured MSEs at the lowest socio-economic levels in Mexican society and did not 
inadvertently survey the middlemen and wholesalers in the sector. 
Table 4. Categorized Income of Informants 
Socio-economic level Monthly income (USD) Informants 
A/B Over $5,667 0 
C+ $2,334-$5,666 0 
C $744-$2,333 0 
D+ $453-$773 0 
D $180-$452 10 
E $0-$179 23 
Declined to answer  1 
When collecting data, we also explored ownership of ICT tools in the sector. Our participants had nearly 
universal access to mobile phones: all but one informant owned one. Further, 18 of 34 (53%) had 
computers at home, while 30 percent of the informants had an email account. Appendix A provides other 
results from the data-collection exercise. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
In analyzing the data, we focused on understanding the meaning that informants attached to IT artifacts. We 
used an iterative process that intertwined the empirical data from both phases of data collection. Consistent 
with Myers (2013), themes from the preliminary data analysis informed the subsequent data collection; our 
analytical strategy emerged from the interviews and observations and also involved thematic analysis to 
ensure we could identify patterns and recurring themes across multiple data sets (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
To develop the themes, we related the data to relevant theory to help explain the phenomena. In this 
approach to data analysis, the theorization and thematic analysis are closely linked. To perform the thematic 
analysis, we chose a word or short phrase to summarize the data and placed the data into that emergent 
theme or silo. This process allowed for flexibility in categorizing and re-categorizing the emergent themes. 
As we developed themes, we presented our work at conferences to initiate a public discussion and expose 
the themes to a broader audience to obtain as much feedback as possible. In doing so, we followed 
Walsham’s (2006) suggestion that one should interpret research findings through the minds of others. 
For this paper, we re-organized the data into themes, and we constantly compared data from interviews 
and observations with one another and with literature on Mexican institutions. Subsequently, we re-
examined the data using the Seo and Creed (2002) framework concepts of contradiction, praxis, and 
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outcome to devise vignettes that best illustrated the competing worldviews of IT artifacts. We define a 
vignette as a focused description of a series of events that represents the case that one studies (Miles, 
1990). We used vignettes to effectively illustrate key practices or details relevant to case research 
(Kotlasky, Scarbrough & Oshri, 2014). After re-examining the data, we identified three suitable vignettes 
that characterized the institutional dynamics in the case and that illustrated the inherent contradictions and 
praxis well. The conceptualization we propose in this paper slowly emerged based on these gradually 
refined theories, feedback from reviewers, and our continual review of the institutional theory literature. 
This overall approach concurs with other qualitative interpretive case studies in the IS field (e.g., Vaast & 
Walsham, 2005; Walsham, 1995, 2006). 
4 Findings and Analysis 
In this section, we describe and analyze the case and, in doing so, examine three vignettes that we 
analyzed using the theoretical framework in Table 2 to explain IT artifacts’ institutionalization. The 
vignettes focus on: 1) the entropy found in the ordering process, 2) the experiences of a thwarted 
entrepreneur, and 3) the implications of prevalence of piracy. 
We conducted the case study in the Taxco handicraft market in the state of Guerrero, a five-hour drive 
from the southwest of Mexico City. The Saturday market, which comprised over 2,000 stalls owned and 
run by the respective MSEs, constituted the primary means for jewelry designers and manufacturers to 
sell their goods. The market resided around the town’s central bus station with stalls set up in school 
playgrounds, on pavements, in parking lots, and on private property that surrounded the bus station. The 
market stalls were particularly basic: they each ran side by side and all looked similar (e.g., they 
comprised tables covered in cloth with the handmade jewelry on top in rows). Some vendors had formed 
“sindicatos” or commercial trade associations that negotiated with owners of suitable property for weekly 
tariffs, while others rented their stalls from the municipal government. The poorest sellers did not rent a 
space in the market and instead walked around trying to find customers while avoiding the local police. 
Mexico features significant poverty and according to the World Bank (2012), some 52 percent of the 
Mexican population lives below the poverty line, and 18 percent live in severe poverty (OECD, 2007). 
Against this backdrop, the Mexican Government, as part of its MDG commitment, has embarked on an 
extensive ICT training program known as e-Mexico to reduce the digital divide and lift indigenous 
communities out of poverty by making markets work better for poorer people (Mexican Ministry of 
Communications and Transportation, 2012). A key program objective focused on increasing how many 
MSEs use ICT (Mariscal, Gil-Garcia, & Aldama-Nalda, 2011). 
4.1 Vignette One: Entropy in the Ordering Process 
Our observations of the transactions that occurred between MSEs and their suppliers revealed that 
individuals from both groups collectively spent a lot of time waiting—whether waiting to place orders or 
waiting for orders to be ready. Even though all MSEs possessed IT artifacts (e.g., mobile phones) that 
offered the means to challenge this apparent inefficiency by streamlining and speeding up the ordering 
process, the institutionalized rituals of in-person visits by suppliers to clients (accompanied by an 
inevitable period of waiting) endured. For example, while we were observing informant 35, one of the 
suppliers arrived. Informant 35 made the supplier wait for 10-15 minutes before speaking with him despite 
not doing anything to justify such a delay. When informant 35 finally went to the door to meet with the 
supplier, they spent approximately 30 minutes talking. They exchanged pleasantries, asked about each 
other’s families, and commented on the weather. After about 30 minutes had elapsed, the supplier asked 
if the informant needed any supplies, and informant 35 then spoke about how slow business was before 
placing an order for some items necessary to produce jewelry. The supplier left while promising to deliver 
the order in a couple of days. 
When the conversation finished, we asked informant 35 where the supplier was going. The informant 
responded that the supplier was probably going around town to get more orders. A short while later, the 
informant left the property and went across town to visit a customer (a retail shop). The ritual repeated 
itself, but this time informant 35 had to wait in the lobby for 10-15 minutes after which the informant and 
the customer spoke for some 15-20 minutes about everything except the business transaction. Towards 
the end of the conversation, informant 35 asked if the customer needed any products. After a short 
discussion on this matter, the customer placed a small order, which informant 35 promised to deliver in a 
few days. Informant 35 then went to another store and the ritual once again repeated. 
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Our findings appear consistent with research that has discovered that business relationships in Mexico 
often rely on personal friendships (Grosse, 2001). The institution of “confianza” refers to one of mutual 
trust and is associated with fairness and honesty (Felix-Brasdefer, 2008). Confianza functions as “a 
psychosocial network” to allow exchanges to occur in the informal sector (Lomitz, 1988, p. 45). 
Nevertheless, these findings appear to contain a crucial inconsistency. If the informant and supplier 
described above were friends, why could they not simply use IT artifacts (e.g., their mobile phones) to 
conduct business? Doing so would allow them to engage in a personal conversation prior to placing an 
order while still enabling them to develop a more efficient mobile phone-based ordering system in a new 
social structure. The inability to develop such a new social structure indicates the innate contradictions 
present in existing institutions. Seo and Creed (2002), in commenting on institutional isomorphism, note 
that initial adaption increases legitimacy, which the ritualized waiting in the ordering process that focuses 
on ensuring ensure trust exemplifies. This social structure has subsequently made further adaption less 
likely because individuals afford legitimacy greater importance than efficiency. It seems apparent that the 
artisans all possess the necessary IT artifacts to improve the efficiency of the ordering process but cannot 
adapt their behavior to incorporate them into the ordering process; they remain wedded to the ritualized 
waiting that pervades the sector. The contradiction involves the institution of confianza and the efficiency 
potential that IT artifacts offer. The legitimacy-building process contradicts the need to use IT artifacts and 
personal site visits, and waiting rituals fulfill another, more opaque purpose. When analyzing the institution 
of confianza in more detail, one can interpret existing social arrangements in which trust is not a constant 
and individuals need to reaffirm it, which the ritualized process of building enough trust to conduct a single 
transaction illustrates. By definition, the informal sector operates outside of the formal regulatory system 
for contract enforcement, and, thus, in the handicraft sector, MSEs use these time-consuming confianza 
waiting exercises to build trust. Confianza does not describe trust in someone to always do the right thing 
but instead refers to a level of trust that a supplier will not betray them. Confianza requires a degree of 
certainty that a supplier will not act opportunistically (e.g., by stealing a deposit or providing low-quality 
products). However, confianza does not indicate the constant presence of trust; rather, it indicates an 
absence of distrust, which would serve to disqualify any supplier from involvement in the MSEs’ business. 
Using this explanation, we can understand the long conversations and waiting that we observed as a 
process designed to ensure continued confianza. An agent who is anxious to secure an order, illustrated 
by an unwillingness to wait or engage in small talk, would signal a need for money and, therefore, be 
assumed to pose a higher risk of theft. Therefore, agents must continually establish and maintain 
confianza via a willingness to wait and engage in long conversations about personal matters. An agent 
who has achieved confianza is said to be “muy simpatico” or very sympathetic (Grosse, 2001). In the 
context of weak regulatory institutions, individuals sanction others who lack confianza by repeatedly 
refusing to conduct business with them. The long personal conversations we observed serve to mitigate 
the risk associated with any transactions. 
While our findings concur with those of other researchers in that they confirm that Mexicans are more 
relational in their business dealings (Crouch, 2004; Fox, 2005), our research demonstrates that 
relationships built up through confianza may only remain valid for one transaction because the process of 
buying jewelry involves coordinating the purchase through many MSEs. Enrolment of IT artifacts requires 
a level of trust that does not currently consistently exist in the institution of confianza. It appears that the 
sectoral adaption to low levels of trust has helped to develop the institution of confianza, which then 
enables MSEs to conduct business. However, such an adaption hinders the necessary adaptability 
required for the enrolment of IT artifacts because the institution of confianza has proved resilient to 
replacing its enduring and more traditional institutionalized trust-building mechanisms. 
4.2 Vignette Two: The Thwarted Entrepreneur 
This vignette tells the story of informant 58 and how institutional contestation thwarted his attempts to 
stimulate the enrolment of IT artifacts in the form of online consolidation of orders. This vignette also 
juxtaposes the institutional logics of the government’s neo-liberal assumptions about the benefits of IT 
artifacts established in “e-Mexico” as part of the mechanism for meeting their MDG, which focus on 
improving market opportunities for poorer people via IT artifacts (Mariscal et al., 2011). We identified one 
MSE who attended a training program linked to e-Mexico and subsequently attempted to incorporate this 
increased knowledge about the use of IT artifacts to help MSEs increase their sales. The ICT training 
programs for MSEs focused on helping them to improve their revenue (Mexican Ministry of 
Communications and Transportation, 2012) based on the capitalist logic that individuals seek to optimize 
their own individual gain. Informant 58 mentioned that the course curriculum had focused on how 
859 Exploring the Dialectics Underlying Institutionalization of IT Artifacts 
 
Volume 18   Issue 12  
 
participants could increase their income by providing better services to clients by using IT artifacts. 
Informant 58 had attended one such government ICT training course and subsequently attempted to 
become a “middleman” or broker between clients and suppliers in the Taxco sector. The informant sought, 
consistent with the e-Mexico training, to use the Internet to improve the ordering process for customers in 
New York, USA. To be successful, other MSEs who sold to that customer had to agree to let this MSE act 
to consolidate and ship the orders to New York on their behalf. 
Under the institutions at the time, all MSEs generated their income from what they could sell. Typically, 
MSEs set up a table at the Saturday market that displayed their products and then waited patiently for 
customers to arrive to buy their goods. The IT artifact that informant 58 attempted to pilot would have 
allowed their New York based client to buy from multiple MSEs and reduced their search and travel costs. 
The artifact also offered a consolidation service to the client that would collect orders from various MSEs in 
the sector and ship multiple products to New York in one order. The use of this IT artifact would potentially 
have saved the client both time and money by enabling re-ordering online rather than physically travelling to 
Mexico as well as economies of scale and reduced transport costs. The MSEs would collectively benefit 
from the increased frequency of orders likely to result from a decrease in the cost of the ordering process 
and an increase in the total aggregate of goods ordered. Informant 58’s proposed strategy concurs with 
many of the benefits attributed to online ecommerce.  The small size of MSEs means that no individual 
supplier has enough variety of products to ship separately and thus no artisans were engaging in 
international shipping. An important part of the arrangement was that in order to take advantage of the on-
line ordering the suppliers must group together their products to justify the cost of international shipping.  
Initially, the other MSEs agreed to participate in the new structure and supplied their respective products 
successfully the first time the client placed an order. However, when the client placed a second order, 
these same MSEs reneged on their agreements. Informant 58 explained: 
Something inexplicable happened, maybe they’re idiosyncratic, sometimes they prefer selling 
their merchandise to a wholesaler that doesn’t treat them as well [as I do] and they left me 
hanging. I was selling that merchandise but for a strange reason once I started to ask for more 
they would stop supplying me and I would look bad in front of the client. 
This quote succinctly illustrates what Seo and Creed (2002) identify as adaptation, which undermines future 
adaptability. We may explain the reneging in this case by the contradiction in enduring institutional arrangements 
(“caciquismo” and “egoismo”) formed by political struggles, divergent interests, and asymmetric power. 
Caciquismo describes the local patronage networks that exist in rural Mexico (Villarreal, 2002) as based 
on over 500 years of elite capture, which has institutionalized a sense of betrayal among the poorest 
people (Howell et al., 2007). Mexican society deeply embeds notions of the elite’s exploiting the lower 
classes, and various researchers have identified the difficulty of conducting business in the country 
(Clifton, 2000; Oppenheimer, 1996) due in part to institutionalized elite capture (caciquismo) in which 
political connections help determine economic success; indeed, betrayal is a common feature of Mexican 
social life (Foster, 1965). Weak regulatory institutions allow the politically connected to gain economic 
benefit; Riding (1985) asserts that many Mexicans resent the abuse of power by those in authority but 
readily admit that they too would take advantage of the benefits of power if they had the opportunity. 
Egoismo refers to behavior that has the ultimate purpose of furthering one’s self-interest (Shaver, 1999). 
In Mexican peasant societies, individuals view a belief in self-importance and egoism as a social ill 
(Aguilar, 1984) because pursuing individual interests runs counter to the institution of “el pueblo”. 
However, the literature on Mexican peasant communities complicates this assumption because research 
believes individuals to consider the impact of their behavioral decisions on the broader community 
(Aguilar, 1984; Lewis, 1963). These communities view egoismo extremely negatively, and individuals who 
brag about their successes are subject to ridicule (Aguilar, 1984). According to Guardino (1996), in the 
19th century, acting in response to the loss of socio-economic and political influence in the newly 
emerging Mexican state, indigenous communities began to develop their own concept of community 
responsibility, which provided the third institution at play in this vignette: el pueblo. Guardino (1996) 
describes how the newly independent Mexican nation centralized power at the expense of the semi-
autonomy of indigenous communities that was a feature of Spanish rule. These communities responded 
by developing the concept of el pueblo (literally translated as “the community” or “the Mexican people”). 
They created this structure to create solidarity against newly established ruling elites, who they believed 
betrayed the interests of el pueblo for personal gain. The relatively recent introduction of neo-liberal 
models of development has generated a renewed activism by these indigenous communities since they 
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once again perceive the state as betraying el pueblo for the benefit of the few (Desmarais, 2010). Mexican 
identity is embedded with a culture of honor (Najera-Ramirez, 1994), and the institution of el pueblo is a 
sociocultural construction that represents such honorable behavior towards others in direct contrast to the 
exploitation implicit in caciquismo, and, thus, this pluralistic institutional environment is imbued with 
inconsistent prescriptions for action. Several researchers have also highlighted a paradox in Mexican 
society where individuals do not perceive their own opportunistic behavior as contradictory to their own 
sense of honor and trustworthiness (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008). Thus, we see a contradiction 
of pluralistic institutional environments imbued with inconsistent prescriptions for action. 
The MSEs’ refused to participate with informant 58’s attempt to introduce a new structure, which we can 
explain as a deliberate strategy to prevent caciquismo that arises as a result of the IT artifact. We can explain 
their praxis in the form of reneging behavior as a response to the contradiction caused by the attempted 
introduction of a new structure that held the potential to alter the relative balance of power of the artisans. The 
praxis of the MSEs in reneging is based on the misaligned interests of potential change agents, and informant 
58’s quotation powerfully illustrates his frustration and belief that he was behaving honorably towards el pueblo. 
We found no evidence that the MSEs actively coordinated their non-compliance; instead, they appeared to do 
so individually due to their institutional beliefs about informant 58’s egoismo. 
Informant 58 believed he was piloting a new social structure that was aligned with the institutions of el 
pueblo and the concomitant requirement to look after the community. We may explain the resulting 
contradiction as one of misaligned interest because, while the individual concerned believed that his 
behavior was consistent with the institution of el pueblo, the other MSEs relied on the institutions of 
caciquismo and egoismo to resist enrolment and believed that the IT artifact formed the basis for negative 
potential changes in the relative balance of power. Other MSEs perceived informant 58’s behavior not as 
supporting el pueblo but rather as an attempt to become a “caciquista” by gaining power through his role 
as consolidator. While all MSEs may have desired increased sales, they would not allow any one 
individual to become a “caqui” via applying egoistic behavior. 
Informant 58 was puzzled and frustrated by other MSEs’ refusing to support the IT artifact designed as it 
was in his perspective to help increase sales for all involved. However, despite this other MSEs 
responded to the second client order by refusing to supply their products. The subsequent reluctance of 
individual MSEs resided in norms against egoistic behavior. Thus, institutional norms against egoismo and 
vigilance against caciquismo prevented the informant from enrolling IT artifacts designed to improve 
organizational performance; instead, they illustrate that capitalist logic contradicted with the multiple 
institutionalized logics present in the Taxco silver handicraft sector. 
4.3 Vignette Three: The Prevalence of Piracy 
This vignette highlights how the conformity to the institutions of “fatalismo” impacted the institutionalization 
of IT artifacts. In Mexico, fatalismo (fatalism) refers to the general acceptance that economic, social, and 
political advancement is not based on merit but instead relies on a higher force (Pick & Sirkin, 2010). 
Researchers have long identified fatalismo as a problem that has an impact at all socio-economic levels in 
Mexican society (Lewis, 1963). Indeed, recent research has confirmed that the power of fatalismo 
continues to prevail. A general acceptance of “the way things are” becomes an obstacle to autonomous 
decision making even when the current situation negatively impacts on the individual (Pick & Sirkin, 2010). 
Paradoxically, other researchers have found that Mexicans readily admit that they too would take 
advantage of others if the opportunity arose (Riding, 1985), with Paz (1985) and have asserted that 
fatalismo gives Mexicans only two choices in life: to become the “chingon” (the male that betrays others) 
or the “la chingada” (the female that is betrayed). The chingon is associated with machismo,and gains 
power and prestige in Mexican society by “chingando” (betraying) others (Cypess, 1991). 
Participants in our research were pessimistic about the role of IT artifacts in relation to piracy, which the 
following statements illustrate: 
I do not email [my clients] photos of the designs. (Informant 50) 
I do not use technology, I know what they [customers] like and remember my customers [and 
the products they order]. (Informant 46) 
If I place my designs [on the Web] they will get copied. (Informant 38) 
I am distrustful of uploading my designs on the Internet, I don’t upload. (Informant 44) 
861 Exploring the Dialectics Underlying Institutionalization of IT Artifacts 
 
Volume 18   Issue 12  
 
The presence and enduring nature of the institution of fatalismo has socialized the artisans in the 
handicraft sector into believing that success or failure is not in their hands: “Sometimes I sell a lot and 
other times others sell more” (informant 37). The institution of fatalism stands in contrast to the capitalist 
logic that individuals have their fate much in their own hands as evidenced by the assumptions contained 
in the diffusion of innovation theory (Rogers, 1962) in which early adopters and innovators embrace IT 
artifacts in order to gain competitive advantage. Overall, our research evidences that, overall, Mexicans 
do not believe that they are in control of their own fate but that fatalismo determines their destiny. In the 
handicraft sector that we explored, we found widespread pessimistic belief that customers, if given the 
opportunity, will betray them by finding another MSE to pirate the design in question and make it more 
cheaply; as a result, the sector contains high levels of opportunism. 
In the institution of fatalismo, we identified a further contradiction related to the trust required for 
individuals to successfully enroll IT artifacts designed to improve organizational performance. The source 
of this contestation comes from a basic conflict between conformity with the institution of fatalismo and the 
assumptions embedded in IT artifacts regarding autonomy, which shape patterns of thought about how 
the development of IT artifacts will benefit the sector. As we discuss above, the Mexican belief in fatalismo 
assumes that all are doomed to betrayal. The contestation highlights the differences in assumptions 
related to social interactions result that individuals identifying as both a chingon (betrayer) and chingada 
(betrayed). Individuals partially form these identities through the institutions of caciquismo, and if they 
have political connections they are able to secure the best-selling locations from the government. 
However, fatalismo involves more than elite capture alone: our findings indicate fatalismo it is actually a 
three-step process that undermines the development of IT artifacts. 
In the first step of the process, individuals view their own behavior as honorable, although they do not 
attribute such a belief to others nor do others reciprocate it as our interview with informant 35 illustrates in 
which he stated that: “I treat my employees honestly, always, always, always!”. 
In the second step, individuals often expect others to behave dishonorably (chingon). Once again, our 
findings indicate that they believe they act reputably: “My prices are just, others have prices that are too 
low” (Informant 35). 
Finally, the conformity with institutions of fatalismo dictates that, as individuals, they must chingar (betray) 
before they become the chingada (the betrayed). When referring to others who operate in the sector, 
informants often viewed the behavior of others as unjust and that this perceived injustice legitimized their 
own behavior: “There are items that everyone has [manufactures] so you defend yourself by offering it 
cheaper” (informant 48). 
Relationships in the supplier support network were clearly adversarial: our findings show that artisans 
commonly believed that their input suppliers were cheating them: 
[In] the diamond cutting there is a silver loss of .3 grams [per gram] that we lose and the 
diamond cutter gains. (Informant 50) 
The pendant supplier is ripping me off. (Informant 35) 
A consistent feature of the sector is a high level of design piracy, which Stromberg-Pellizi (1993) has also 
previously noted. A casual observer who strolled through the Taxco handicraft market would invariably 
notice a multitude of duplicated products. In our two data-collection phases, almost all informants admitted 
to pirating designs, although they invariably placed the responsibility for piracy on another agent. This 
adversarial position contributed to the high levels of resistance that individuals expressed toward using 
any IT artifact for business purposes since they felt that using these tools would risk exposing them to 
higher levels of piracy from both customers and competitors. As informant 37 said: “Yes, I copy [pirate] 
designs, sometimes a customer brings me a piece from somewhere else and I make it”. 
When examining the praxis using the Seo and Creed (2002) framework, we identified that the misaligned 
interests of potential change agents run counter to deeply embedded beliefs of fatalismo. MSEs had not 
attempted to adopt IT artifacts because they believed it would enable their customers and suppliers to 
more easily pirate their designs. While a casual observer can easily see that the sector contained high 
levels of piracy, informants appeared unwilling to assume any responsibility for the low levels of property 
rights because they admitted their own role in piracy only after another MSE positioned piracy as 
something they do, which is consistent with the paradox of Mexican society that MSEs are both a chingon 
(betrayer) and the chingada (betrayed). 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Our case highlights some of the challenges of institutionalization of IT artifacts. Specifically, we explore 
the dialectics in and between institutions and understanding the process of how and under which 
circumstances IT artifacts fail to be institutionalized furthers our understanding of the challenges of using 
ICT4D as a means to further human development. Our case illustrates the contradictions between 
assumptions embedded in IT artifacts and their interplay with local institutional structures. 
In various ways, the vignettes explain how heterogeneous actors through praxis resolve contradictions. 
Concurring with Lawrence et al. (2011), our analysis demonstrates the value of abandoning the notion of 
techno-centric solutions to ICT4D (Avgerou, 2010; Fonseca, 2010) and suggests instead the need to 
focus on local social structures and the actors that populate them. A failure to institutionalize IT artifacts 
does not involve technical deficiency or financial viability but institutional permissibility. As such, one 
needs to examine various actors more closely to fully understand them and the context in which they live. 
In this section, we explain the contestation that occurs when IT artifacts are introduced into an 
organizational field. Specifically, we discuss IT artifacts and local institutions in relation to two themes: 
how 1) institutional incompatibility and 2) collective agency limit institutionalization. 
5.1 Institutional Incompatibility Limits Institutionalization 
Dialectics provides a theoretical framework to examine the contested process when new institutional 
structures are introduced into an organizational field. Our case demonstrates through vignettes one and 
three how, at times, institutional incompatibility between IT artifact and local institutions limit 
institutionalization. The use of institutional theory provides a valuable historical context of how local 
institutions have developed certain practices to ensure organizational legitimacy and survival. Further, the 
case identifies how institutions endure and unpacks the contradictions with the IT artifacts. 
The first vignette focuses on the entropy present in the ordering process through which we identified 
contradictions between institutions, IT artifacts, and confianza. We found efficiency contradictions in the form 
of ritualized personal conversations that represent adaptations to build legitimacy: the ordering process has 
been historically institutionalized as a time-consuming process designed to build rapport and confidence 
between agents to facilitate a single transaction. This lengthy face-to-face ritual contradicts Neo-liberal 
assumptions embedded in IT artifacts (e.g., such as by providing MSEs with mobile phones to call suppliers, 
which would substantially reduce the amount of time they spend travelling around the town to place orders). 
This dialectic played out in the form of contestation and failure to institutionalize. Institutional conformity 
embedded in the trust-building institution of confianza in the informal sector contradicted the efficiency logic 
of IT artifacts. The contradiction between IT artifact and locally embedded belief systems persisted because 
the situation lacked any potential change agents and the required reflective shifts in how agents perceived 
the benefits of adopting IT artifacts to the ordering process. As a result, actors did not mobilize for 
institutional change but collectively mobilized against it and the enrolment of IT artifacts. 
The third vignette shows the prevalence of piracy and demonstrates the contradiction between institutions; 
namely, the promise of improved efficiency embedded in the IT artifact and conformity with the institution 
of fatalismo. For, while IT artifacts in LMIC are introduced to help individuals based on the premise that 
they provide data-storage, communication, and other benefits the benefits gained from efficiencies in data 
storage and communications inter alia the prevalence of piracy results in minimal effort from artisans in 
the implementation of such IT artifacts. MSEs cynically believe that adopting IT artifacts, such as emailing 
digital images to clients, will not improve their income but will instead enable their customers to use these 
images to find other artisans who will undertake similar work for less money. This cynicism pervades IT 
artifacts, which MSEs do not welcome as institutions that will improve their human development but, on 
the contrary, that will further erode their meager incomes. 
Our findings challenge Chaudhuri’s (2012) contention that emotive factors have a more generalized role in 
enrollment of IT artifacts than utilitarian factors. Instead, we provide a perspective of institutionalization 
involving the interplay between multiple contradictions in which the ensuing contestation does not 
predetermine outcome. Thus, we avoid any deterministic claim of any one institutional feature’s taking 
precedence when IT artifacts are introduced. 
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5.2 Collective Agency Limits Institutionalization 
The e-Mexico initiative has had only limited success in convincing MSEs in the informal sector to enroll IT 
artifacts (Mariscal et al., 2011). In the second vignette of the thwarted entrepreneur, we discern 
contradictions between the capitalist logic of the e-Mexico training and the institution of el pueblo. We identify 
how plans to implement consolidated ordering gave MSEs the possibility to economically develop the Taxco 
handicraft market by increasing the frequency of orders. However, the contradictions with local institutions 
that assume exploitation from external agents inhibited enrolment of the IT artifact. While the thwarted 
entrepreneur pursued the capitalist logic in introducing the IT artifact, other actors did not interpret these 
efforts as praxis designed for the benefit of el pueblo but as self-serving behavior (egoism). From this, we 
can identify a complex interplay of contradictions from various actors as to what it means to adhere to the 
institution of el pueblo. When examining the materials produced as part of the government-training program, 
we identified various assumptions embedded in the curriculum, which included a focus on the need for 
entrepreneurs to take the lead on implementation. Consistent with the critique of the “hero narrative” of 
institutional entrepreneurship (Dorado, 2005), our analysis indicates that the thwarted entrepreneur could not 
single-handedly implement IT artifacts in the organizational field. While we found only one example of the 
rise of a potential change agent, this isolated shift resulted in sectoral mobilization and collective action 
against the implementation of the IT artifact. The findings highlight the importance of interactions between 
actors in the organizational field and move beyond simple assumptions that institutional entrepreneurs will 
emerge to lead individuals to enroll IT artifacts. This finding concurs with Lawrence et al.’s (2011) assertion 
about the importance of distributed agency and allows one to understand agency as a complex process that 
results from different and often contradictory institutional pressures. This approach identifies the challenges 
that actors in ICT4D face, which the case of the thwarted entrepreneur in particular shows. In this example, 
other MSEs who operated in the sector viewed the attempted implementation of the IT artifact as yet another 
example of caciquismo (external agent of exploitation). 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the contestation between IT artifacts and local institutions in depth. Through our 
analysis, we identify how the institutionalization of IT artifacts conflicts with institutional structures by drawing 
on Seo and Creed’s (2002) dialectical framework. In doing so, we identify the sources of contestation and 
examine how, through praxis, individuals resolve these issues. By using an institutional framework, we 
explain the importance of historically institutionalized structures. Our findings indicate that the 
institutionalization of IT artifacts is a conflicted process in which new institutions attempt to impose new 
social structures. Through our analysis, we illustrate how actors make sense of these new IT artifacts and 
respond collectively to prevent institutionalization. We argue how these actors do so contributes to the 
human-centered perspective of development (Sein & Harindranath, 2004), which researchers often 
associate with Amartya Sen’s capability approach (2001). We ground our institutional analysis in a 
development context aligned with Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013) macro “view from above” of the role of 
extractive and inclusive institutions on development. Zooming out on this macro level of analysis presents 
the role of extractive institutions in the vignettes—in particular the lack of legal enforcement of contracts and 
property rights in Mexico. In our dialectical analysis, we go further by unpacking the “rules of engagement” in 
the interplay between institutions and IT artifacts. Zooming in provides a “view from below” as the three 
vignettes show and highlights in detail the nature and effect of Mexican extractive institutions on ICT4D. This 
“view from below” contributes to human-centered approaches to development that ICT4D research and 
practice have embraced due to their emphasis on realizing individual potential with people at the center of 
the development process whether economically, environmentally, socially, or politically (Bass et al., 2013). 
When considering an operationalization of this perspective, our dialectical analysis provides a framework for 
examining the multiple perspectives of “what IT represents” for intended beneficiaries, illustrates how the 
structures interplay with agency, and the praxis that influences development outcomes. 
This research makes two key theoretical contributions. Firstly, senior scholars have previously identified 
prominent gaps in theorizing the context of ICT4D (Avgerou, 2010; Walsham, 2013). In response, we contribute a 
novel dialectical theoretical framework to the literature that considers the institutionalization of IT artifacts in the 
informal sector. We do so by extending Seo and Creed’s (2002) framework into the ICT4D research discourse. 
The combination of dialectics and institutional theory in Seo and Creed’s analytical frame is pertinent to making 
sense of the effects of competing interpretations of IT artifacts and offers a framework to practically unpack “what 
ICT represents” (Sein & Harindranath, 2004, p.19) and the resultant contradictions and praxis. 
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Secondly, we build on the institutional discourse literature by building on Abrahamson (1996), which Diaz-
Andrade and Urquhart (2012) further developed into the concept of a “modernity bias”. Embedded in IT 
artifacts are assumptions of modernity, progress, and the rationality of improving efficiency. However, our 
findings reveal the presence of contradictions and contestation: trust mechanisms may not be 
simplistically embedded in the IT artifact and, thus, may not replace ritualized institutions (e.g., the 
“waiting around” seen in in the first vignette), and apparently irrational institutionalized transaction costs 
endure as a means to both demonstrate and reaffirm trust. 
LMIC research has the potential for reverse innovation because the dynamics of failure to institutionalize 
IT artifacts remain largely absent from mainstream IS literature. The opportunity to examine developing 
country institutions provides a nuanced understanding of the processes of institutionalization, which may 
remain invisible to an unreflective practitioner. The institutions found in the informal sector of LMICs (such 
as Mexico) tend to amplify institutional responses when compared with those of developed countries’ 
institutions, with the contradictions and contestation readily observable. Dodson et al. (2012) report a 70 
percent failure rate of ICT4D projects; thus, applying Seo and Creed’s (2002) framework as we illustrate in 
the vignettes has obvious value for mainstream IS research. 
Our research makes three practical contributions that will assist both researchers and development 
practitioners in identifying local solutions. Firstly, researchers and practitioners should expend effort to 
identify existing institutions to position the IT artifact as consistent with current institutional arrangements. 
Second, while identifying these existing institutions, development practitioners should also seek to identify 
“institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) since they should be autonomous enough to act 
as change agents. Our vignettes provide practical guidance as to how to develop strategies to align 
actions in institutional structures and to anticipate possible contradictions. We posit that this approach has 
value for practitioners of the human-centered discourse (e.g., Kleine, 2010) because the theoretical 
framework in our research functions as a practical toolkit for both practitioners and researchers alike in 
order to appreciate the contested nature of the process between change agents and those individuals and 
groups who hold views that may contribute to contestation. 
Note that, in this paper, we focus on one informal sector and, in doing so, potentially missed some micro and 
macro influences on the institutions and institutionalization process. For instance, we do not consider how 
radical changes such as disruptions to the technological, political or economic context, or other societal shifts 
(Lyytinen & Rose, 2003) may influence whether individuals adopt IT artifacts. Furthermore, while we used 
ethnographic techniques in our fieldwork, we may have gained additional insights if we had engaged in a 
longitudinal study. Our focus on a single sector in Mexico may itself prove limiting because, while single case 
research design has many precedents (e.g., Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007; Levina & Vaast, 2008), 
researchers have sometimes criticized it for its potential to generalize. Following Walsham’s (1995, 2006) 
guidance on generalizing interpretive cases, we focused on theoretical development in the form of a 
combined framework and an illustration of the major concepts from an empirical case that offers rich insight. 
Finally, we encourage others to apply this dialectical framework to other contexts. In particular, two areas 
warrant further investigation. First, further research should examine contestation in different LMIC settings 
to further explore the role of context. Second, while we identify the mismatch between IT artifacts and 
local institutions, it would be worthwhile for researchers to continue to explore how to align local 
institutional structures with IT artifacts in order to identify the sources of contradiction and to build an 
understanding of the praxis. Thus, we suggest that IS research focus on LMIC as suitable contexts to 
explore the institutionalization of IT artifacts as sources of reverse innovation. 
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Appendix 






Do you have 
a landline 
telephone? 
1: yes, 2: no 
Do you have 
a cell 
phone? 1: 
yes, 2: no 
Do you have 
a fax 
machine? 1: 
yes, 2: no 
Do you have 
a computer? 
1: yes, 2: no 
Do you have 
email? 1: 
yes, 2: no 
Do you have 
a Facebook 
account? 1: 
yes, 2: no 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 10 1 1 2 2 2 2 
3 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 
4 5 1 1 1 1 1 2 
5 12 1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 8 2 1 1 2 2 1 
7 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
8 4 1 1 2 1 1 2 
9 6 1 1 2 1 2 2 
10 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 
11 10 1 1 2 2 1 2 
12 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
13 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
14 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 
15 3 1 1 2 2 1 2 
16 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 
17 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 
18 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 
19 4 2 1 2 1 2 2 
20 7 2 1 1 1 2 2 
21 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 
22 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 
23 6 2 1 2 1 2 2 
24 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 
25 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 
26 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 
27 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
28 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 
29 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
30 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
31 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 
32 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 
33 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 
34 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 
Average # of 
employees 4.1  
Total # of informants with 
access to the ICT artifact  
No: 21  
Yes:13 
No: 1  
Yes: 33 
No: 23  
Yes: 11 
No: 16  
Yes: 17 
 No: 25  
Yes: 8 
No: 29  
Yes: 3 
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